This afternoon was for concluding arguments. Since the elected vestry was designated the plaintiff in the various connected cases, its attorney presented the first concluding argument, the defendant, Mr Lancaster, would present his concluding argument, and the plaintiff's attorney would present a rebuttal. Judge Strobel asked the attorneys to address two issues in their concluding arguments: the factual findings of the California appeals court in the case, in particular whether the elected vestry had addressed the questions about the eligible voters in the August 6, 2012 election; and the question of how far this trial court could deviate from the opinion in the appeals court's decision remanding the case for retrial.
Ms Rineer handled the concluding arguments for the elected vestry. She laid out the arithmetic facts of the balloting on August 6, as well as the documented procedure for developing the list of eligible voters. The total ballots sent out were 59. 40 were returned, with 1 disqualified for technical reasons. The total of "no" votes for revising the corporate bylaws varied depending on technical issues, but the standard calculations, from the appeals court hearing onward, resulted in a "yes" total in the range of 67% to 70%, all above the two-thirds supermajority required to amend the bylaws.
Ms Rineer's concluding argument also noted that Mrs Bush had, by her own testimony, said she had become the senior warden of a competing "vestry" not recognized as the elected vestry by the appeals court, and had voluntarily stopped attending either regular or special elected vestry meetings. Ms Rineer also pointed out that the California corporation code does not require any type of vestry or board approval for a vote to amend bylaws, so that any problem with a vestry meeting resulting from Mrs Bush not attending or not receiving notice of the meeting was irrelevant.
Mr Lancaster handled the dissident-ACA concluding arguments. He argued, in response to Judge Strobel's charge, that the appeals court opinion allowed the ACA the latitude to present arguments of any sort regarding the validity of the August 6, 2012 vote. The opinion requires that evidence be found in vestry meeting minutes of the criteria used to develop a list of eligible voters. He did not feel that the evidence supported this requirement.
He argued that the vestry that developed the eligible voter list was invalid, for numerous reasons, especially the lack of required notice to Mrs Bush of special meetings. He argued that the presence of Fr Kelley, who had been inhibited by the ACA, at the meetings meant he was not a valid member. In addition, two other members, who had been excommunicated by Anthony Morello following his questionable appointment as Rector, also rendered them unqualified.
Adding the presence of unqualified members on the vestry to violation of meeting notice rules for Mrs Bush made any action by the vestry regarding the August 6 election invalid. Judge Strobel interrupted to ask if Mr Lancaster had raised these issues in the initial trial under Judge Linfield. Mr Lancaster said he hadn't. She asked him if he'd raised them with the appeals court. He said he hadn't.
He then went on to raise a California case, Huber v Jackson, in which individuals who had disavowed membership in a particular denomination had been found by the court to have validly violated the denomination's bylaws and thus been successfully excluded as members in good standing.
Judge Strobel noted that the instructions of the California appeals court in this case were specific as to which voter list to use in retrial, and this limited her ability to consider his arguments. Rightly or wrongly, the appeals court specified that the January 2012 eligible voter list was to be used in the retrial.
In rebuttal, Ms Rineer pointed out that the appeals court had also specifically rejected the idea that the list of eligible voters was something fluid, subject to constant updates, and it had specified the January 2012 list be used. In addition, she pointed out again that the corporation code does not require any type of vestry vote or authorization for a vote by members to amend bylaws. Whether notice to Mrs Bush, made or not, of any vestry meeting made the meeting invalid had no bearing on the validity of the vote.
Ms Rineer pointed out that Huber v Jackson covered a different set of circumstances, in which adherents to a particular denomination vowed eternal fealty to the denomination. In disavowing eternal fealty, the court found certain members had violated a particular provision of the group's bylaws, which did not apply in the case of St Mary of the Angels. (I may look into this apparently bizarre case myself.)
Judge Strobel said she would take the matter under advisement. It is likely that she will take some time to make her decision. I'll post some additional reflections on the trial this weekend.
